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In Search of the Golden Mean: Examining the
Impact of the President's Proposed
Changes to the CFAA on
Combatting Insider Misuse
Shawn E. Tuma*
That moral virtue is a mean, then, and in what sense it is so, and
that it is a mean between two vices, the one involving excess, the
other deficiency, and that it is such because its character is to aim
at what is intermediate in passions and in actions, has been suffi-
ciently stated.
So much, then, is plain, that the intermediate state is in all things
to be praised, but that we must incline sometimes towards the ex-
cess, sometimes towards the deficiency; for so shall we most eas-
ily hit the mean and what is right.,
I. INTRODUCTION
Aristotle's description of the Golden Mean eloquently describes the
struggles the United States Legislature experienced when attempting to find
the right balance for the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). This strug-
gle is especially prevalent when one applies the CFAA's regulations to cases
involving privileged users. The struggle continues.
In his 2015 State of the Union address, President Barack Obama made
the case for amending the CFAA's "exceeding authorized access" definition.
According to the White House, the proposed amendment "modernizes the
[CFAA] by . . . making clear that it can be used to prosecute insiders who
abuse their ability to access information to use it for their own purposes."2
While the President deserves to be commended for focusing the nation's at-
tention on cybersecurity risks as a pervasive threat to our society, whether the
proposed legislation would accomplish the stated objective is another issue.
* Partner, Scheef & Stone, L.L.P., Frisco, Texas. Website: www.solidcounsel
.com. B.A., Northwestern State University, with honors; J.D., Regent Univer-
sity School of Law, magna cum laude. Mr. Tuma would like to thank his wife,
Rachel, and five children, Katherine, Seth, Andrew, Christopher, and Clara for
their loving support and understanding during the preparation of this article.
1. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHIcs, Book II. Ch. 9.
2. SECURING CYBERSPACE - President Obama Announces New Cybersecurity
Legislative Proposal and Other Cybersecurity Efforts, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan.
13, 2015), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/13/securing-cy
berspace-president-obama-announces-new-cybersecurity-legislat; see Updated
Administration Proposal: Law Enforcement Provisions, https://www.white
house.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/updated-law-enforcement-
tools-section-by-section.pdf [hereinafter CFAA Amendment].
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The CFAA is a criminal statute that was enacted in 1986.3 In 1994, an
amendment to the statute added a provision that allows a complainant to
bring a private civil cause of action for many violations of the Act.4 Gener-
ally, the CFAA prohibits the misuse of computers by intentionally or know-
ingly accessing a computer "without authorization" or by "exceed[ing]
authorized access."5 In theory, the statute indicates that the "without authori-
zation" prong should apply to users who do not have any access privileges.
These individuals are referred to as "outsiders." The "exceeds authorized ac-
cess" prong applies to individuals who have limited access privileges. These
users are referred to as "insiders" or "privileged users." In practice, however,
there is significant confusion between the two concepts, and in some cases
these prongs are used interchangeably. The interchangeability of the two con-
cepts will be discussed in more detail below. At this point it is sufficient to
simply recognize the confusion between the two prongs of the CFAA.
This article examines two structural changes to the statutory language of
the CFAA that the President recommends in the CFAA Amendment. First, it
examines the negation of the civil cause of action under the CFAA, which
the author of this article presumes to be inadvertent. This negation would
occur if the factors set forth in subsection (c)(4)(A)(i)6 were removed, as
recommended by the CFAA Amendment. Second, the article examines the
amended definition of "exceeding authorized access," and analyzes how the
change in language will impact the overall objective of combatting insider
misuse of computers and data.
Ultimately, this article concludes that, while the proposed amendment's
language may help resolve one aspect of the confusion, it would only create
more confusion elsewhere. Additionally, the proposed amendment would
still fail to achieve its stated objective of achieving a better balance. The
CFAA Amendment attempts to find the Golden Mean, but instead of attain-
ing the desired balance, it continues to shift between excess and deficiency.
A. The CFAA Amendment Proposes-Hopefully Inadvertently-the
Elimination of the Civil Cause of Action
The CFAA Amendment, if enacted as written, would eliminate the civil
cause of action under the CFAA. It appears this change was inadvertent be-
cause language that supports the civil cause of action still remains in the
amendment. What is intriguing is how, or why, the drafters could have inad-
vertently negated such an essential element to the statute.
3. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008)).
4. Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 174 A.L.R. FED. 101 (2001).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1) (2008).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i) (2008).
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While the CFAA is primarily a criminal statute, it also provides for a
civil cause of action and economic damages.7 The procedure for invoking the
civil remedy is complex, and therefore, has proven to be a fruitful area for
litigation.8 Navigating it correctly has proven to be as much of a challenge
for judges9 as it has been for lawyers.o Perhaps it was equally challenging
for the White House.
The CFAA provides two requirements for a private right of action."
First, section 1030(g) provides that a civil cause of action is available to
"[a]ny person who suffers damage or loss [from a violation of the CFAA]"12
Second, civil remedies are restricted to claims arising out of conduct involv-
ing one of the five factors in subsection (c)(4)(A)(i).13 These factors include:
(I) loss to I or more persons during any 1-year period (and, for
purposes of an investigation, prosecution, or other proceeding
brought by the United States only, loss resulting from a related
7. Yoder & Frey Auctioneers, Inc. v. EquipmentFacts, LLC, 774 F.3d 1065, 1072
(6th Cir. 2014) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g), (c)(4)(A)(i)(I)). ("The CFAA is
primarily a criminal statute, but it also provides for a civil right of action and
economic damages in certain circumstances, such as when a violator causes a
'loss' of at least $5,000 in value to one or more persons during any one-year
period.").
8. Shawn E. Tuma, "What Does CFAA Mean and Why Should I Care?" A Primer
on the Computer Fraud & Abuse Act for Civil Litigators, 63 S.C. L. REV. 141,
182 (2011) (noting that the terms used most frequently in CFAA's civil litiga-
tion are access and damage, and explaining that loss is explicitly required to
plaintiffs who file under (c)(4)(A)(i)(I)).
9. See Shawn Tuma, Yes, Texas is a Good State for Plaintiffs to Bring a CFAA
Claim, BUSINESS CYBER RISK LAW BLOG (Feb. 14, 2015), http://shawnetuma
.com/2014/03/08/yes-texas-is-a-good-state-for-plaintiffs-with-a-cfaa-claim/
(critiquing a recent ruling on a motion to dismiss where the court failed to
distinguish between losses and damages under the CFAA.); see also Shawn
Tuma, Loss and Damage Are Not Interchangeable Under CFAA-District
Court Blows Right Past CFAA's "Loss" Requirement in Sysco Corp. v. Katz,
BUSINESS CYBER RISK LAW BLOG (Feb. 14, 2015), http://shawnetuma.com/
2013/10/13/loss-and-damage-are-not-interchangeable-under-cfaa-district-court-
blows-right-past-cfaas-loss-requirement-in-sysco-corp-v-katz/ (critiquing the
court's interchangeable treatment of the loss and damage requirements by
referencing the statutory language of section 1030(g) "[a] civil action . . . may
be brought only if" as clearly stating otherwise).
10. Tuma, Yes, Texas is a Good State for Plaintiffs, supra note 9, at 184 n.352
(noting that "many of the CFAA cases that are dismissed for failure to ade-
quately state a claim are dismissed because the plaintiff has not met this thresh-
old pleading requirement").




SMU Science and Technology Law Review
course of conduct affecting 1 or more other protected computers)
aggregating at least $5,000 in value; (I) the modification or im-
pairment, or potential modification or impairment, of the medical
examination, diagnosis, treatment, or care of I or more individu-
als; (11) physical injury to any person; (IV) a threat to public
health or safety; [or] (V) damage affecting a computer used by or
for an entity of the United States Government in furtherance of the
administration of justice, national defense, or national security
14
A plaintiff must plead the damage or loss precisely in order to bring a
civil CFAA claim. This is because pleading loss or damage, through the fac-
tors present in subsection (c)(4)(A)(i), is an absolute requirement.'5 Of the
five factors, the overwhelmingly dominant factor used in civil casesl 6 is (1):
"loss to I or more persons during any 1-year period . . . aggregating at least
$5,000 in value."'7 For example, the plaintiff must plead that, during any one
year period, she sustained a loss of at least $5,000 because of a CFAA viola-
tion.18 Each of the statutory requirements-damage or loss and a violation of
one of the subsection (c)(4)(A)(i) factors-must be satisfied before the
CFAA vests the court with jurisdiction.19 Thus, the CFAA civil remedy is
predicated on the existence of conduct violating one of the first five factors
of subsection (c)(4)(A)(i).
Yet, the CFAA Amendment completely eliminates subsection
(c)(4)(A)(i) without replacing it or removing the mandatory language for a
civil cause of action: "[a] civil action for a violation of this section may be
brought only if the conduct involves I of the factors set forth in subclauses
(I), (II), (III), (IV), or (V) of subsection (c)(4)(A)(i)."20 With subsection
(c)(4)(A)(i) removed from the CFAA amendment, were it to pass, it would
no longer be possible to properly plead a civil cause of action under the
CFAA.
It would be a terrible mistake to remove the civil cause of action from
the CFAA, whether intentionally or inadvertently. If this private cause of
action is removed, the CFAA's enforcement is exclusively left to federal en-
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I)-(V) (2008).
15. Yoder & Frey Auctioneers, Inc. v. EquipmentFacts, LLC, 774 F.3d 1065, 1072
(6th Cir. 2014).
16. Tuma, Yes, Texas is a Good State for Plaintiffs, supra note 9, at 183.
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I) (2008).
18. Grant Mfg. & Alloying, Inc. v. McIlvain, 499 F. App'x. 157, 159 (3d Cir.
2012); A.V. ex rel. Vanderhyne v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 646 (4th
Cir. 2009).
19. See Quantlab Techs. Ltd. (BVI) v. Godlevsky, 719 F. Supp. 2d 766, 776 (S.D.
Tex. 2010).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (emphasis added).
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tities. Unfortunately, the federal law enforcement and prosecutors that pursue
the vast majority of the criminal CFAA cases lack the resources to consist-
ently pursue all but the most substantial violations.21 Because of this, many
of the CFAA violations would never be pursued if not for private parties'
ability to pursue their own civil cause of action against the violating user.
This is especially true in many of the cases involving users that have privi-
leges to use the computers (i.e., "privileged users" or "insiders") but abuse
those privileges to misuse either the computers or the data accessible through
them. Additionally, many insider cases are less likely to warrant criminal
prosecution because they do not involve financial losses in the millions of
dollars, a threat to public health and safety, national security, or a threat to
the United States' critical infrastructure.22
For these reasons, the CFAA Amendment should include an amendment
to section 1030(g)23 to maintain a civil cause of action even if the language
set forth in subsection (c)(4)(A)(i)24 is removed. The CFAA is very compli-
cated,25 highly nuanced, and laden with procedural hurdles that are interre-
lated and vital to effectively using the law.26 Accordingly, those who draft
proposed changes to the CFAA must thoroughly understand the law, the
body of law surrounding it, and how it fits with other cyber-related laws on a
grand scale. Without taking such a holistic approach, more mistakes are
imminent.
II. DOES THE AMENDED DEFINITION OF "EXCEEDING AUTHORIZED
ACCESS" FIND THE RIGHT BALANCE To EFFECTIVELY
COMBAT THE PROBLEMS OF INSIDER MISUSE?
A. The Perceived Need for a New Definition of "Exceeding
Authorized Access"
The primary structural change suggested in the CFAA Amendment is
the revision of the CFAA's definition of "exceeds authorized access" to
"mak[e] clear that it can be used to prosecute insiders who abuse their ability
to access information to use it for their own purposes."27 The purpose of this
is to resolve what is commonly referred to as the circuit split:
21. Shawn Tuma, Will Changes to the CFAA Deter Hackers?, DARKMArTERS Su-
PERIOR ATTACK INTELLIGENCE BLOG (Feb. 3, 2015), http://blog.norsecorp.com/
2015/02/03/will-changes-to-the-cfaa-deter-hackers/.
22. Id.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i).
25. See Tuma, "What Does CFAA Mean and Why Should I Care?", supra note 8,
at 154 n.102.
26. Id.
27. CFAA Amendment, supra note 2.
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The Ninth Circuit's 2012 decision in United States v. Nosal cre-
ated a circuit split regarding the interpretation of the phrase "ex-
ceeds authorized access" in the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(CFAA). The Ninth Circuit (since joined by the Fourth Circuit)
held that one "exceeds authorized access" to a computer by violat-
ing an access restriction (e.g., do not access File X), but not by
violating a use restriction (e.g., do not use the computer for non-
business purposes). This interpretation conflicts with the First,
Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, which have held that use re-
strictions are within the scope of "exceeds authorized access."28
The circuit split focuses on the conflicting interpretations between the
First,29 Fifth,30 Eleventh,31 and Eighth32 Circuits on the one hand, and the
Ninth33 and Fourth34 Circuits on the other. But to be more accurate, there
remain three distinct lines of interpretation.35 The Trilogy of Access Theories
include the Strict Access Theory, which describes the Ninth and Fourth Cir-
cuit approaches, the Intended-Use Theory, which describes the Fifth Circuit
and its brethren, and the Agency Theory, which describes the still-binding
precedent in the Seventh Circuit.36
B. The Courts Have Been Inconsistent in Distinguishing Between the
Two Access Provisions
The CFAA Amendment is strictly focused on the definition of "exceed-
ing authorized access," and many cases now focus on this prong as the point
of contention.37 However, the pertinent cases frequently avoid taking such a
purist approach, and blur the lines between the "without authorization" and
28. Stuyvie Pyne, The Computer Fraud & Abuse Act: Circuit Split & Efforts to
Amend, BERKLEY TECH. L.J. (Mar. 31, 2014), http://btlj.org/2014/03/31/the-
computer-fraud-and-abuse-act-circuit-split-and-efforts-to-amend/.
29. EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001).
30. United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010).
31. United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010).
32. United States v. Teague, 646 F.3d 1119 (8th Cir. 2011).
33. United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012).
34. WEC Carolina Energy Solutions, LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012).
35. See Tuma, "What Does CFAA Mean and Why Should I Care?", supra note 8,
at 176.
36. Shawn E. Tuma, Emp't Agreement Restrictions Determined Whether Emps. Ex-
ceed Authorized Access Under Computer Fraud & Abuse Act, BUSINESS CYBER
RISK LAW BLOG (Jan. 27, 2013), http://shawnetuma.com/2013/01/27/employ
ment-agreement-restrictions-determined-whether-employees-exceeded-author
ized-access-under-computer-fraud-and-abuse-act/.
37. CFAA Amendment, supra note 2.
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"exceeding authorized access" prongs. 38 It would be preferable for courts and
lawyers to carefully articulate which prong they are following.39
Moreover, while it is easy to become fixated on whether it is one or the
other, the reality is that the legislation is being proposed is to solve a prob-
lem. That is, to establish a solution to the problem of insiders misusing their
privileges. The problem needs no designation as to which prong it finds itself
in, it simply needs a solution. If a solution to the problem is to be found, we
must focus directly on the problem itself and work from there to find the
solution. This is a better approach than trying to find solutions and then hop-
ing to adapt them to the problem. In other words, we must first identify the
objective and then work to find the appropriate solution. Accordingly, while
the CFAA Amendment focuses on the "exceeding authorized access" lan-
guage, this article will avoid being so limited and instead look at the cases
and options that address the "without authorization" language as well.40 Our
objective is not to find the best definition for the "exceeding authorized ac-
cess" prong or to find the best means of categorizing computer fraud cases as
either unauthorized or excessive access cases. Rather, the proper objective is
to find a means of controlling the problem of privileged users abusing their
privileges by accessing computers and data which they then misuse.
III. TOWARD A UNIFIED THEORY OF CFAA ACCESS JURISPRUDENCE
The framework of the Trilogy of Access Theories may be used to ana-
lyze the issue of insiders misusing their privileges to accomplish illicit pur-
poses, but this article takes an alternative approach.41 Just as the courts have
struggled to fit the cases before them into the dichotomy of "without authori-
zation" or "exceeding authorized access," so too have politicians, judges,
lawyers, and commentators struggled to fit consistently the cases into one of
the three main theories of access. 42 So too has the author of this article. Thus,
going forward, instead of overcomplicating the analysis with false dichoto-
mies, artificial definitions, or the like, we must simplify it by focusing on the
problem.
The best way to address the problem is to stop analyzing cases in a
framework that relies on a determination of which access theory those cases
fall within, and instead, to simply analyze the primary CFAA access cases
under a unified theory of CFAA Access Jurisprudence that categorizes the
cases' factual scenarios and then considers if and how the respective jurisdic-
38. See, e.g., Miller, 687 F.3d 199.
39. See Tuma, "What Does CFAA Mean and Why Should I Care?", supra note 8,
at 173-81.
40. Computer Fraud & Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030).
41. See, e.g., Tuma, Emp't Agreement Restrictions, supra note 36.
42. See, e.g., Pyne, supra note 28.
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tions resolve the issue. This approach allows us to determine exactly where
the problem lies. From there, we can apply the current CFAA's legal frame-
work and contrast it against the proposed CFAA Amendment to determine
whether the proposed amendment helps, hurts, or does not have much
impact.
There are five primary fact patterns that describe most CFAA cases. It is
initially helpful to envision with the mind's eye a continuum with points on
each end and three points scattered throughout the middle. The following
categories of case fact patterns represent the points on the continuum, with
the first category being on the left end, the fifth on the right end, and the
others in between:
(1) Privileged user without notice of owner's intended use misusing the
computer or data during privileged access. 43
(2) Privileged user with notice of owner's intended use, properly ob-
taining data during privileged access but later misusing data.44
(3) Privileged user with notice of owner's intended use, misusing the
computer or data during privileged access. 45
(4) Privileged user whose privileges are terminated before access of
computer or data.46
(5) Non-privileged user access of computer or data.47
After analyzing the leading authorities in this context, the article will
compare how they address the issues that the CFAA Amendment seeks to
resolve, and determine whether the new definition will more effectively com-
bat insider misuse.
A. The Proposed CFAA Amendment Language
The CFAA presently defines "exceeds authorized access" as "to access
a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter infor-
mation in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or al-
ter. . .... ."48 The CFAA Amendment includes the following amended definition
of "exceeds authorized access" with strikethrough text indicating deletion
and italicized text indicating insertion of language in the current definition:
(6) "exceeds authorized access" means to access a computer with
authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information
in the such computer-
43. See, e.g., Int'l Airport Ctrs. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006).
44. See, e.g., New Show Studios v. Needle, No. 2:14-cv-01250-CAS(MRWx),
2014 WL 2988271 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 2014).
45. See, e.g., United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Steele, No. 13-4567, 2014 WL 7331679 (4th Cir.
2014).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2008).
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(A) that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter; or(B) for a
purpose that the accesser knows is not authorized by the computer
owner . . . .49
There are conflicting lines of authority that sometimes create difficulty
in interpreting the statute. Likewise, there is a need to correct these conflict-
ing lines of authority. The real question is, however, whether the CFAA
Amendment is the answer.
B. The Five Categories of Cases on the Access Jurisprudence
Continuum
1. Privileged User Without Notice of Owner's Intended Use
Misusing the Computer or Data During Privileged
Access
The starting point for analyzing the cases on the Access Jurisprudence
Continuum is International Airport Centers, LLC v. Citrin.50 This case in-
volved an employee, Citrin, who was working in the real estate business and
was lent a laptop from his employer "to record data that he collected in the
course of his work in identifying potential acquisition targets."51 Citrin de-
cided to quit and go into business for himself, but before returning the laptop
to his employer, "he deleted all the data in it-not only the data that he had
collected but also data that would have revealed to [his employer] improper
conduct in which he had engaged before he decided to quit."52 Citrin did not
simply "delete" the data in the normal course. Instead, he "loaded into the
laptop a secure-erasure program, designed, by writing over the deleted files,
to prevent their recovery."53 His employer had no copies of what he
deleted.54
Despite the fact that Citrin had been a privileged user at the time of his
surreptitious activities, the Seventh Circuit did not restrict itself to analyzing
the case as only one of "exceeding authorized access":
Muddying the picture some, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
distinguishes between "without authorization" and "exceeding au-
thorized access," and, while making both punishable, defines the
latter as "access[ing] a computer with authorization and . . .
us[ing] such access to obtain or alter information in the computer
that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter." That might
seem the more apt description of what Citrin did.
49. CFAA Amendment, supra note 2.
50. Int'l Airport Ctrs. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420-21 (7th Cir. 2006).
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The difference between "without authorization" and "exceeding
authorized access" is paper thin, but not quite invisible. In EF
Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., for example, the former em-
ployee of a travel agent, in violation of his confidentiality agree-
ment with his former employer, used confidential information that
he had obtained as an employee to create a program that enabled
his new travel company to obtain information from his former em-
ployer's website that he could not have obtained as efficiently
without the use of that confidential information. The website was
open to the public, so he was authorized to use it, but he exceeded
his authorization by using confidential information to obtain better
access than other members of the public.s5
The Seventh Circuit found this case to be different. Citrin terminated his
agency relationship when he breached his duty of loyalty to his employer,
"and with it his authority to access the laptop, because the only basis of his
authority has been that relationship."56 The court treated this "insider" case as
an "outsider" or "without authorization" case under the CFAA.57
The Citrin approach is referred to as the Agency Theory. From the per-
spective of the computer owner, it is the most permissive of the three main
theories of access, and it requires very little subversive behavior by a privi-
leged user to find that he exceeded his authorized access. 58 Envision the
Agency Theory as being the point on the far left end of the Trilogy Contin-
uum. There is some question as to whether the Seventh Circuit would adhere
to this approach now. The other circuit courts that have addressed this issue
would not follow such a lax standard.
a. Will the CFAA Amendment Impact these Cases?
It is possible that under the proposed "exceeding authorized access" lan-
guage, a court would find that Citrin was accessing the computer "for a pur-
pose that [he] knows is not authorized by the computer owner,"5 9 but it is far
from certain. In the jurisdictions that have recognized privileged users ex-
ceeding authorized access violations, they have typically required a clear and
unequivocal notice, setting forth the intended-use and prohibited uses for
their access.60 There would surely be litigation on this point.
55. Id. at 420 (citing EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577,
583-84 (1st Cir. 2001)).
56. Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420-21.
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. Id. at 418.
60. See United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010).
12 [Vol. XVIII
Proposed Changes to the CFAA
2. Privileged User with Specific Notice of Owner's Intended Use,
Properly Obtaining Data During Privileged Access but
Later Misusing Data
a. New Show Studios LLC v. Needle
While this scenario could manifest in many ways, there is a recent ex-
ample in New Show Studios LLC v. Needle.61 In New Show Studios, a former
employee continued to use his former employer's information after his termi-
nation by having current employees access information and supply it to him.
The court dismissed the CFAA claim because the plaintiff did not plead any
access to a computer:
To prevail on a CFAA claim, plaintiffs must establish, among
other things, that defendants "intentionally accessed a computer."
But the [first amended complaint (FAC)] is devoid of any allega-
tion that the defendants accessed any computer. Instead, the FAC
only alleges that Needle "gained access to confidential and sensi-
tive information." Accessing plaintiffs' information, however, is
not the same thing as accessing plaintiffs' computer systems, even
if that information was at some point stored on those computers.
The Ninth Circuit has specifically cautioned against reading the
CFAA as an "expansive misappropriation statute." If plaintiffs
wish to assert a claim under the CFAA, they must plainly allege
that defendants' [sic] accessed their computer systems, and ex-
plain the basis for those allegations.62
As New Show Studios demonstrates, it is quite a challenge to find ways
to use the CFAA, a law that has been defined as an "access violation," to
protect data that was properly obtained and keep it from being misused at a
later time.
b. Dice Corporation v. Bold Technologies
The Sixth Circuit highlighted the necessity for wrongful access in Dice
Corp. v. Bold Technologies.63 There, the parties were competing providers of
alarm monitoring software that provided their software to companies in the
alarm industry.64 ESC Central was plaintiffs customer and had a database
that stored large amounts of data for ESC's customers, including "names,
addresses, contact information, billing information, and information regard-
61. New Show Studios v. Needle, No. 2:14-cv-01250-CAS(MRWx), 2014 WL
2988271 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 2014).
62. Id. at *6.
63. Dice Corp. v. Bold Tech., 556 F. App'x 378 (6th Cir. 2014).
64. Id. at 379.
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ing the type and location of alarms."65 ESC became dissatisfied with plaintiff
and moved its business to defendant, Bold Technologies.66
To facilitate a seamless transition for ESC's customers, defendant wrote
a program to extract ESC's data from plaintiffs software and convert it into
a format that could be read by defendant's software.67 Under normal opera-
tions, ESC could access plaintiffs database files of ESC's customer data and
retrieve the data without circumventing any of plaintiffs security measures. 68
Also during this time period, one of plaintiffs employees went to work for
defendant and assisted in the transfer of ESC's data from plaintiff to defen-
dant. Plaintiff sued defendant for violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act. The plaintiff's claims were premised on the allegation that the employee
accessed plaintiffs servers while working for defendant,69 which the em-
ployee flatly denied.70
In deposition, plaintiff admitted that it had no evidence of when or how
the employee allegedly hacked into its servers. Plaintiff stated:
I don't know how Bold got our-got all of our intelligence.... It's
not a question for me to answer, it's a question for you to answer.
How did Bold get access to those files[?] . . . I don't know how
Bold got the information to be able to do what they've done. I
have no idea. All I know is that they have it. . . .71
The district court granted summary judgment for defendant because
plaintiff admitted that it had no evidence; indeed, plaintiff had no idea of
when, how, or specifically whether the former employee actually accessed its
server after her employment terminated.72 The employee offered a plausible
explanation for how the information was obtained that did not involve her
accessing plaintiffs server, which supported the defendant's motion and
warranted summary judgment.
Plaintiff appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment on all claims.73 The Sixth Circuit found
the Computer Fraud and Abuse claim failed because the plaintiff failed to
65. Id.
66. Id. at 380.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Dice Corp., 556 F. App'x at 381.
70. Id. at 388.
71. Dice Corp. v. Bold Tech., 913 F. Supp. 2d 389, 398-99 (N.D. Mich. 2012)
(alterations and omissions in original).
72. Id. at 416.
73. See Dice Corp., 556 F. App'x at 388.
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show intentional access, which is required under the CFAA.74 In this case,
plaintiff claimed that the defendants wrongfully accessed its servers by per-
forming a "Go To Assist Function" to access those servers. 75 The defendants,
however, were unaware that by performing a "Go To Assist Function" they
could access plaintiffs servers.76 Accordingly, they could not have intention-
ally accessed the servers and there was no CFAA violation. The Sixth Circuit
noted that "Even assuming this claim [was] fairly raised, it would still fail.
Liability under the CFAA requires a showing of intentional access. Neither
Narowski nor Condon was aware that performing a Go To Assist Function
on ESC Central servers allowed access to Dice servers in Bay City,
Michigan."77
i. Will the CFAA Amendment Impact these Cases?
The circuit courts have not addressed the specific fact pattern that is
described above. It is included because it is likely to occur, and would not
violate the CFAA Amendment.78 In this scenario, a privileged user has been
given authorization to access the owner's computer and data for specific pur-
poses, and those purposes are clearly communicated to the privileged user.79
The user then accesses the computer, obtains data that she uses for the in-
tended purpose, and retains the data.80 Her access to the computer and the
data was proper, and for its intended use.8 1 Subsequently, the basis for pro-
viding access-in this example, employment-is terminated. The person
then goes to work for a competitor, discovers she still has the former em-
ployer's data and, for the first time, decides to use it (and does use it) for an
improper purpose.82 Would this be a violation of the proposed "exceeding
authorized access" definition?
Under this scenario, it should not be a violation due to exceeding au-
thorized access or access without authorization83 The proposed definition
focuses on the accesser's intent-her state of mind-at the time of access,
and it requires that the accesser "know" the purpose of access is not author-
74. Id.
75. Id. at 387.
76. Id. at 388.
77. Id. (internal citation omitted).
78. See CFAA Amendment, supra note 2.
79. See Dice Corp., 556 F. App'x 378; see also New Show Studios v. Needle, No.
2:14-cv-01250-CAS(MRWx), 2014 WL 2988271 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 2014).
80. See Dice Corp., 556 F. App'x 378.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See CFAA Amendment, supra note 2.
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ized by the computer owner.84 Under this definition, at the time of access, the
acceser neither had an improper purpose nor knew of an improper purpose,
which would not come into existence until some point in the future.85 But the
problem with attempting to draft CFAA language to cover this scenario is
that it would require CFAA's prohibitions to continue to attach to the data
long after the time of its access and its separation from the computer.86
There are now two focal points in this analysis: the device, and the data
that is no longer associated with the device.87 The CFAA has always focused
primarily on wrongful access to computers (i.e., the device).88 Endeavoring
to extend the CFAA to the realm of the data far beyond its separation from
the computer is much more like trade secrets that focus on the data itself.89
This means that at least under the current understanding of the CFAA, this is
an issue that cannot be covered by the CFAA, or at least not by the CFAA
alone.90 This is problematic because, at least on a high level, this is one of the
key issues of "insider misuse" that the CFAA Amendment is intended to
address.91
3. Privileged User with Specific Notice of Owner's Intended Use,
Misusing the Computer or Data During Privileged
Access
This category of cases is closer to the middle on the Access Jurispru-
dence Continuum, and is the one that has received the most attention and
stirred up most of the controversy over the circuit split.92 There are two lines
of legal authority within this category, those cases in which courts have
found the accesses were wrongful in violation of the CFAA, and those in
which they did not. The courts have not arrived at these holdings by adhering
to a strict dichotomy of whether it was by exceeding authorized access or
access without authorization, and neither will this article.93 This is likely the






89. See CFAA Amendment, supra note 2.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 271 (5th Cir. 2010); see also
LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009); Int'l
Airport Ctrs. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420-21 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Shurgard
Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121
(W.D. Wash. 2000)).
93. See John, 597 F.3d at 271.
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a. Cases Found to be Wrongful Access CFAA Violations
i. United States v. John
The leading case finding a wrongful access CFAA violation where a
privileged user misused the data obtained from a computer even though the
owner provided specific notice of the intended-use is United States v. John.94
John involved a defendant that worked for Citigroup as an account manager
who was authorized to access the company's computer system containing
customer account information.95 Citigroup's policies prohibited the misuse of
company computers and information.96 In violation of those policies, the de-
fendant obtained customer account information, which she then provided to
others who used the information to make fraudulent charges on the ac-
counts.97 At trial, the defendants were convicted for violating the CFAA by
exceeding authorized access to a protected computer.98 The Fifth Circuit up-
held the conviction, holding that an owner of a computer (and the right of
access) can establish policies limiting the use of information obtained by
permitted access to a computer system and the data available on that sys-
tem.99 The violation of these policies exceeds authorized access under the
CFAA.100
The John court applied the "exceeding authorized access" prong of
CFAA access violations, not its earlier reasoning in United States v. Phil-
lips,1oI which dealt with the "without authorization" prong.10 2 In doing so, the
court explained its "intended-use analysis" as follows: access to a computer,
as well as the permissible use of the information available from the com-
puter, can be defined by the owner's policies, and any access or use in viola-
tion of those policies exceeds authorized access. 103
ii. United States v. Rodriguez
Soon after John, the Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Rodriguez,104
applied the same reasoning as that of John to find that the owner of access to
a computer can define the limits of the privileges to access or use of the
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 269.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 269-70.
99. Id. at 272-73.
100. John, 597 F.3d at 272-73.
101. United States v. Phillips, 477 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2007).
102. John, 597 F.3d at 271-72 (citing Phillips, 477 F.3d at 219).
103. Id. at 272-73.
104. United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010).
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computer and stored data through its policies. As a result, any access or use
of the computer or stored data exceeds authorized access. 0 5 Rodriguez in-
volved a situation in which an employee of the United States Social Security
Administration had improperly accessed personal information-that he was
authorized to access for business purposes-in violation of the Administra-
tion's policy.106 The Eleventh Circuit upheld his conviction, holding that
"Rodriguez exceeded his authorized access and violated the [CFAA] when
he obtained personal information for a nonbusiness reason."107
The court's rationale looked to the Administration's clear policy prohib-
iting such conduct; when Rodriguez violated the policy, he therefore ex-
ceeded his authorized access. 08 Essential in these cases finding wrongful
access violations of the CFAA is the Administration's implementation of
policies limiting the authorization of access to work computers for business
reasons only, as well as the Administration's efforts to ensure that the em-
ployees were aware of such policies.109 Then, when the privileged individuals
use their access to the computers and data for non-business purposes, they
exceed the intended use as defined by the policies; and therefore, exceed
their authorized use in violation of the CFAA.110
iii. United States v. Teague
Following the reasoning of John and Rodriguez, in United States v.
Teague, the Eighth Circuit upheld the conviction of Sandra Teague for ex-
ceeding authorized access in violation of the CFAA."'1 Teague was an em-
ployee of Vangent Corporation, Inc., a Department of Education contractor
with privileged access to the National Student Loan Data Systems-a
database containing borrowers' private information.112 Teague was "one of
nine privileged users who accessed the student loan records of now-President
Barack Obama. Teague was indicted for and convicted of one count of ex-
ceeding authorized access to a computer.113
105. See id. at 1263 (citing John, 597 F.3d at 269-72).
106. Id. at 1260.
107. Id. at 1263.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1263.
111. United States v. Teague, 646 F.3d 1119, 1120 (8th Cir. 2011).
112. Id. at 1121.
113. Id.
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iv. United States v. Tolliver
In United States v. Tolliver,'l4 the Third Circuit issued an unpublished
opinion in which it upheld the conviction of a bank employee under the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act for accessing information for a non-business
purpose. This was in violation of the bank's prohibition against employees
looking at customers' accounts and personal information without a business
purpose."1 5 The indictment charged Tolliver with accessing a computer in
excess of authorization to obtain a financial record.l16 In upholding the con-
viction, the Third Circuit found that "there was sufficient evidence from
which to infer that Tolliver intentionally accessed the customers' accounts
and that she did not have a business purpose to do so. As such, the govern-
ment established that Tolliver exceeded her authorized access." The court
therefore affirmed the defendant's conviction under the CFAA."i7
v. CollegeSource v. AcademyOne
On February 5, 2015, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued Col-
legeSource v. AcademyOne, an unpublished opinion that was consistent in its
rationale with Tolliver.118 In College Source, a dispute arose between two
companies competing in the college credit-transfer information market.119
CollegeSource sued Academy One, alleging that AcademyOne misappropri-
ated the contents of its online computer database to gather information for
use in its own database.120
Specifically, CollegeSource provides an online catalog of information
that allows paying subscribers to search and inspect over 50,000 digital
course catalogs and other school related information culled by CollegeSource
from the offerings of colleges throughout the United States.121 CollegeSource
endeavored to keep its competitors from obtaining this information by using
various methods, including a browsewrap noticel22 declaring "that distribu-
114. United States v. Tolliver, 451 F. App'x. 97 (3rd Cir. 2011).
115. Id. at 100.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 103-04.
118. CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., No. 12-4167, 2015 WL 469041 (3d
Cir. Feb. 5, 2015).
119. Id. at *1.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See generally Venkat Balasubramani, What's a Browsewrap? The Ninth Cir-
cuit Sure Doesn't Know-Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble, TECH. & MKTG. LAW
BLOG (Aug. 9, 2014), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2014/08/whats-a-
browsewrap-the-ninth-circuit-sure-doesnt-know-nguyen-v-barnes-noble.htm
(explaining, and criticizing, the Ninth Circuit's definition of a broweswrap as
an online agreement posted on the bottom of a webpage).
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tion and noncommercial use are prohibited."]23 CollegeSource also used a
clickwrap agreement 24 that stated, "'by signing in above, I agree to be
bound by the terms of the . . . Subscription Agreement' . . . [which] state[d]:
'[t]his Subscriber Agreement and Terms of Use govern your use of Col-
legeSource Online' . . . [and] commercial use of the data is prohibited."125
AcademyOne was a direct competitor to CollegeSource, offering a free
online alternative to CollegeSource. AcademyOne sought, unsuccessfully, to
purchase a license to CollegeSource's database. After being denied,
AcademyOne hired a Chinese contractor (Beijing Zhongtian-Noah Sports
Science Co., LTD.) to download the information from its original sources-
the individual schools' websites.126 Ultimately, it was discovered that
AcademyOne's database contained catalogs that bore CollegeSource's copy-
right and disclaimer.1 27 Thus, CollegeSource sued AcademyOne for violating
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, among other statutory provisions.128 The
district court granted summary judgment on the CFAA claims, Col-
legeSource appealed, and the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's
rulings.129
While both the district court and the Third Circuit ruled against finding
liability on the CFAA claims, the language used in the Third Circuit's opin-
ion is instructive as its analysis is similar to that employed in Tolliver. Spe-
cifically, the court looks to see if AcademyOne downloaded information in
violation of the Subscription Agreement 30 or any other contractual or techni-
cal limitation;131 i.e., whether the user of the site exceeded the limitations
imposed for accessing and using the information.
Based on these cases, a privileged user's own subjective change in moti-
vation for accessing the computer or data is not enough, by itself, to termi-
nate authorization. The same was true in the Citrin case of the Seventh
123. AcademyOne, 2015 WL 469041, at *1.
124. See Balasubramani, supra note 122.
125. AcademyOne, 2015 WL 469041, at *1.
126. Id.
127. See id. at *2.
128. See id.
129. Id. at *10.
130. See id. ("There is no evidence, however, that those employees downloaded
catalogs for commercial use in violation of the Subscription Agreement. . . .").
131. See AcademyOne, 2015 WL 469041, at *10. ("These materials were available
without precondition to any member of the general public who clicked the link
on the subscribing school's website and was thereby directed to CS's servers.
Thus again, Al obtained the materials in question without breaching any ...
contractual term of use.").
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Circuit.132However, nothing requires that the owner of authorization ex-
pressly notify the user that his access is terminated (as we will see with one
of the categories discussed, infra). Rather, the owner can preemptively im-
plement certain restrictions on access and use of information obtained by
policies and agreements that are known to the user. And courts will consider
any access unauthorized under the CFAA if the user violates those limita-
tions by accessing information and using it for improper purposes or for any
other reason that is not for its intended use.
b. Cases with No Wrongful Access CFAA Violations
The leading cases, which come from the Ninth Circuit, find there was
not a wrongful access CFAA violation where a privileged user misused data
obtained from a computer, even though the owner provided specific notice of
the intended use. For example, in LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka,133 the
Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the Seventh Circuit's rationale in Citrin and
held that a strict interpretation of the CFAA prohibits only the unauthorized
access to a computer, rather than the corresponding unauthorized use of im-
properly obtained information.134 According to Brekka, once an employee is
authorized to access a company computer, authorization of his access contin-
ues even if his loyalties to his employer change and he begins doing an-
other's bidding.135 Regardless of an employee's subjective loyalties and
intentions, or overt actions, the employer must expressly terminate his
authorization.136
In April 2011, the Ninth Circuit briefly departed from this rationale, and
distinguished Brekka, when a panel of the court decided United States v.
Nosal (Nosal 1).137 The Ninth Circuit explained that when a computer owner
has placed limitations on the privileges a user is given, and the user vio-
lates-or exceeds-those limitations, the user exceeds his authorized ac-
cess. 138 This new rationale did not last long; nearly a year later, in April
2012, the Ninth Circuit reverted to its earlier position in Brekka when it de-
cided the second United States v. Nosal (Nosal II).139 In Nosal II, the court
132. See Int'l Airport Ctrs. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420-21 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 112, 387 (1958) ("Unless otherwise
agreed, the authority of the agent terminates if, without knowledge of the prin-
cipal, he acquires adverse interests or if he is otherwise guilty of a serious
breach of loyalty to the principal.")).
133. 581 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009).
134. See id. at 1134-35.
135. See id. at 1133-34.
136. See id. at 1 135.
137. See United States v. Nosal, 642 F.3d 781, 782 (9th Cir. 2011).
138. Id. at 787.
139. See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012).
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held that "'exceeds authorized access' in the CFAA is limited to violations
of restrictions on access to information, and not restrictions on its use."140
Soon thereafter, in July 2012, the Fourth Circuit followed the same line
of reasoning as the Ninth Circuit when it decided WEC Carolina Energy
Solutions, LLC v. Miller, essentially adopting the Ninth Circuit's rationale in
Nosal II.141 WEC Carolina did not add much to the substantive analysis on
this issue, so Nosal II remains the standard. Envision these cases as falling
near the middle but to the right of the Third, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh
Circuits on the Trilogy Continuum.
c. Will the CFAA Amendment Resolve the Confusion with
These Cases?
The purpose of the CFAA Amendment is to clearly establish a cause of
action allowing for "[prosecution of] insiders who abuse their ability to ac-
cess information to use it for their own purposes."I42 This is a broad defini-
tion that encompasses multiple different categories of cases. The CFAA
Amendment is designed to eliminate confusion in this line of cases and es-
tablish some consistency in holding privileged users responsible for the mis-
use of information. Whether it will achieve these purposes, however, is not
so clear.
The same issues regarding the timing of the intent that the court dis-
cussed in Dice Corporation v. Bold Technologies apply here. There are sev-
eral other issues and questions that arise here as well. For example, it remains
unclear what it means to "know" under the new Amendment language. As
discussed above, both John and Rodriguez required that the owners establish
clear designations of intended and prohibited use for the computers, as well
as actual knowledge of those designations by the accessers. On the other
hand, the CFAA Amendment only requires that the access be for a purpose
that the accesser knows is not authorized to support a violation. This is a
lower standard compared to the requirements of the Fifth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits. As a result, there are some questions as to whether those circuits will
require the same level of knowledge as under the prior CFAA language, or
whether they will start from scratch in applying the new text. Another ques-
tion to consider is whether the new standard reaches down to the level of
what Citrin found as sufficient to revoke authorization to access, such as a
subjective change of loyalties.
Similarly, what does "is not authorized" mean under the new Amend-
ment language? Does this mean that any use is prohibited unless it is specifi-
cally authorized? Or, does it mean that any use is authorized unless it is
specifically identified as being not authorized? Many companies have poli-
140. Id. at 864 (emphasis in original).
141. See WEC Carolina Energy Sols., LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 203, 207 (4th
Cir. 2012).
142. CFAA Amendment, supra note 2.
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cies that authorize the use of the computer system for "business purposes
only" and prohibit use of the computer system for non-business purposes.1 43
Will the law apply differently depending on whether a company has one, the
other, or both of these statements in their Acceptable Use Policy?
Overall, the CFAA Amendment adds some guidance by making it clear
that the CFAA, as amended, intends to prohibit misuse by insiders on a more
granular level. However, this is the extent of the guidance. In reality, the
Amendment raises more questions than answers, which means there will be
considerable litigation over the new language. Finally, the CFAA will not
become more certain and predictable, but rather will become just the
opposite.
4. Privileged User Whose Privileges Are Terminated Before
Access of Computer or Data
a. United States v. Steele
On December 24, 2014, the Fourth Circuit issued its opinion in United
States v. Steele, which explains its view on and application of the CFAA's
"exceeds authorized access" language.144 Despite this explanation, the case
only directly involved the court's application of the "without authorization"
language to a former privileged user.145
The defendant, Robert Steele, was a former vice president of business
development for Platinum Solutions, Inc.146 Steele also served as the com-
pany's backup information technology systems administrator.147 This respon-
sibility provided Steele with the opportunity to access and monitor employee
email accounts, including their passwords, and to set up a "backdoor" ac-
count into the company network.148 Platinum's business was providing con-
tract IT services to government defense agencies.149 When Platinum was sold
to SRA International, Inc., Steele subsequently resigned his employment and
went to work for a competitor.150 For nine months following his resignation,
Steele continued to log in to SRA's network via the "backdoor" account to
download documents and emails related to SRA's ongoing contract bids.'5'
143. See Tuma, "What Does CFAA Mean and Why Should I Care?", supra note 8
(explaining that companies can restrict the employee's use of company com-
puters and data).
144. United States v. Steele, No. 13-4567, 2014 WL 7331679 (4th Cir. 2014).





150. Steele, 2014 WL 7331679, at *1.
151. Id.
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Steele continued to have access to the "backdoor" account as SRA had not
changed Steele's password to this account. 15 2 An FBI investigation con-
cluded that Steele accessed the SRA server nearly 80,000 times, which led to
Steele's conviction on two misdemeanor and twelve felony counts under the
CFAA for accessing the SRA server "without authorization."153
Steele appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of appeals, arguing that his
actions did not violate the CFAA "because SRA did not change his access
password when he resigned, [and his] post-employment access, though 'ethi-
cally dubious' was not 'without authorization' as contemplated by the stat-
ute."154 Steele relied on WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller to
support his argument. 155 In Miller, after analyzing the definition of "authori-
zation" as used in the CFAA, the Fourth Circuit found that Miller accessed
the information prior to his resignation and thus was not in violation of ac-
cessing "without authorization" under the CFAA.156 In Steele, the Fourth Cir-
cuit upheld its definition of "authorization" developed in Miller, but
distinguished the two cases based on the timing of the revocation of the ac-
cess privilege occurred:
Importantly, this split focuses on employees who are authorized to
access their employer's computers but use the information they
retrieve for an improper purpose. Steele's case is distinguishable
for one obvious reason: he was not an employee of SRA at the
time the indictment alleges he improperly accessed the company's
server.... [T]he fact that Steele no longer worked for SRA when
he accessed its server logically suggests that the authorization he
enjoyed during his employment no longer existed.157
Building on this reasoning, the court looked at the trial evidence and
found that it provided ample support for the conviction:
SRA took steps to revoke Steele's access to company information,
including collecting Steele's company-issued laptop, denying him
physical access to the company's offices, and generally terminat-
ing his main system access. And Steele himself recognized that
his resignation effectively terminated any authority he had to ac-
cess SRA's server, promising in his resignation letter that he
would not attempt to access the system thereafter. Just because
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at *2.
155. Id.
156. See WEC Carolina Energy Sols., LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 203, 207 (4th
Cir. 2012).
157. Steele, 2014 WL 7331679, at *2 (citing LVRC Holdings v. Brekka, 581 F.3d
1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2009); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.09 (2006)).
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SRA neglected to change a password on Steele's backdoor ac-
count does not mean SRA intended for Steele to have continued
access to its information.58
What is intriguing about the Fourth Circuit's analysis in the Steele deci-
sion is its refusal to acknowledge the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit cases and
their progeny. The Steele court began its discussion by describing the circuit
split in an intriguing manner, particularly, the choice to reference the "broad
view" in the circuit split.159 Rather than providing a more accurate descrip-
tion of this broad view by including reference to the Fifth Circuit's John
opinion or the Eleventh Circuit's Rodriguez opinion, the court instead com-
parted its preferred "narrower view," to the questionable Citrin opinion of
the Seventh Circuit, saying:
The broad view holds that when employees access computer in-
formation with the intent to harm their employer, their authoriza-
tion to access that information terminates, and they are therefore
acting "without authorization" under § 1030(a)(2). The narrower
construction, adopted by WEC Carolina, holds that § 1030(a)(2)
applies to employees who unlawfully access a protected com-
puter, but not to the improper use of information lawfully
accessed. 160
It is curious that the Fourth Circuit relied on Citrin to contrast its pre-
ferred narrower view of the Ninth and Fourth Circuits. Importantly, the court
did not even mention what has become the majority view, which is repre-
sented by at least four of its sister circuits.161 Indeed, the court in WEC Caro-
lina made no mention of this alternative view, the cases explaining it, or even
its sister-circuits that follow that view. Even more curious is the fact that the
court in WEC Carolina heavily relied on Nosal II, in which the Ninth Circuit
at least acknowledged the existence of this line of authority, though it did not
analyze its rationale.162
While Steele is a recent case, it clarifies the termination point of a user's
authorized access: when a user is given access privileges to a computer by
virtue of a relationship with the computer's owner. Under this theory, any
authorization to access the computer ends when the relationship ends. Thus,
the court would deem any post-relationship accesses, regardless of how ac-




160. Id. at *2 (internal citations omitted).
161. See Pyne, supra note 28 and accompanying text.
162. See LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 203, 203 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 862-63 (9th Cir. 2012).
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b. Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc.
The Northern District of California decided Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc.
in August 2013, addressing insiders, privileged users, and those who abuse
their privilege.16 3 The case discussed how courts are using the tools they have
before them to resolve problems in the context of the conflicting lines of
cases. This case dealt with a privileged user who used the information availa-
ble on a website in a manner that the granting authority disapproved.164 The
court found that, in this situation, the granting authority could properly termi-
nate the specific user's right to access the website, even though the website
was generally available to the public.165 Furthermore, any subsequent access
by the user was "without authorization" and would violate the CFAA.166
The facts of Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc.1 67 are instructive. 3Taps oper-
ated an online service that aggregated and republished ads from Craigslist in
real time, which Craigslist viewed as illegally scraping content.1 68 Because
Craigslist is public, 3Taps argued it had authorization to access the web-
site.1 69 The court found the argument persuasive.170 But what Craigslist did
next made this case significant.
After learning about 3Taps' activities, Craigslist provided written notice
to 3Taps stating, "[t]his letter notifies you that you and your agents, employ-
ees, affiliates, and/or anyone acting on your behalf are no longer authorized
to access, and are prohibited from accessing craigslist's website or services
for any reason."171 Then Craigslist used the technological measures available
to it by configuring its website to block access from IP addresses associated
with 3Taps.172 3Taps ignored the notice letter and easily circumvented these
efforts by simply using different IP addresses and proxy servers to success-
fully conceal its identity, and continued to access the website.173
Craigslist ultimately discovered these acts and sued 3Taps for violating
the CFAA. The primary issue was whether the CFAA applies when the
owner of an otherwise publicly available website takes steps to restrict access
163. Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
164. See id. at 1180.
165. See id. at 1184.
166. Id.
167. See id. at 1178-81.
168. Id. at 1180.
169. Craigslist, Inc., 964 F. Sup. 2d at 1182 (citing Pulte Homes, Inc. v. Laborer's
Int'l Union of N. America, 648 F.3d 295, 304 (6th Cir. 2011) (public presump-
tively authorized to access "unprotected website")).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1180-81.
172. Id. at 1181.
173. Id.
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by specific entities.174 The court reasoned that Craigslist made its website
publicly available initially and, therefore, authorized access to the world.175
Craigslist sought to revoke that permission on a case-by-case basis through
its cease-and-desist letter and IP blocking measures.1 76 The issue narrowed to
whether Craigslist had the authority to de-authorize access in this manner.1 77
The court found that "[']authorization['] turns on the decision of the
[']authority['] that grants-or prohibits-access."178 Craigslist, as owner of
the website, rescinded that permission for 3Taps so further access by 3Taps
was "without authorization."l79 The court looked to the Ninth Circuit's
Brekka80 holding as confirming "that computer owners have the power to
revoke the authorization they grant."81 In Brekka, "an employee logged into
his work computer with valid credentials provided by his employer and
emailed valuable documents from the employer's computer to the em-
ployee's personal e-mail address for use in his own competing business."82
The Brekka Court reasoned that the plain language of the CFAA indicates
that authorization depends on actions taken by the employer.183 Therefore, a
person uses a computer "without authorization" under [the CFAA] when the
person has not received permission to use the computer for any purpose
(such as a when a hacker accesses someone's computer without any permis-
sion) or when the employer has rescinded permission to access the computer
and the defendant uses the computer anyway.1 84
3Taps's access was unauthorized even though Craigslist authorized the
world to access the public information on the website because "just as
Brekka instructed that an 'authority' can do, it rescinded that permission for
3Taps. Further access by 3Taps after that rescission was 'without
authorization.' "'85
174. See id.
175. Craigslist, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d at 1182.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1184.
179. Id. at 1183.
180. LVRC Holdings v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2009).
181. Craigslist Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d at 1183 (citing Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1129-30,
1134).
182. Id.
183. See id. (citing Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127).
184. Id. (emphasis added).
185. Id. at 1184.
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c. Facebook, Inc. v. Grunin
The Northern District of California decided a similar case on January 8,
2015. In Facebook, Inc. v. Grunin, Grunin created fraudulent accounts on
Facebook, which is free and open to virtually all.186 With these fraudulent
accounts, he set up a scheme to bilk Facebook out of a substantial amount of
advertising revenue.' 87 Similar to Craigslist, Facebook sent cease and desist
letters terminating Grunin's authorization to access the site and implemented
technical measures to block his access. 88 Grunin continued his scheme and
ultimately generated advertising fees in excess of $340,000.189 Facebook
sued, and the court, relying in part on Brekka and Craigslist, found his ac-
cesses were "without authorization," and in violation of the CFAA.190 Ac-
cording to Craigslist, the CFAA allows the owner of the subject computer to
terminate access to that computer if it provides clear and unambiguous no-
tice.191 Facebook followed that procedure exactly, but Grunin ignored the
notice. He deliberately violated Facebook's requests by continuing to access
the website, essentially demanding Facebook pay a ransom to stop his
scheme.
The courts have not yet distinguished between accesses that are "with-
out authorization" and those "exceeding authorized access." In many cases,
the boundaries between the two not only blur, but overlap.192 However,
Craigslist narrowed the playing field in terms of how to deal with disloyal
insiders. When there is a known, disloyal insider, the owner of access can
provide notice terminating the authorization and limiting the former privi-
leged user from continuing to access or use the computer or information. If
the user circumvents those limits, all subsequent accesses will be "without
authorization" and therefore will violate the CFAA.
On the heels of Craigslist, two issues remain: (1) how to deal with the
unknown disloyal insider; and (2) how to preemptively deal with the privi-
leged user's misuse of computer information before the granting authority is
able to terminate authorization.
d. NetApp, Inc. v. Nimble Storage, Inc.
A recent California district court case demonstrates similar factual cir-
cumstances and outcomes to Steele. In NetApp, Inc. v. Nimble Storage, Inc.,
186. Facebook, Inc. v. Grunin, No. C 14-02323 WHA, 2015 WL 124781, at *4




190. See id. at *4-5.
191. See Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
192. See Tuma, "What Does CFAA Mean and Why Should I Care?", supra note 8,
at 174-75.
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the court rejected the argument that technological barriers must exist to es-
tablish lack of authorization. 193 The court pointed out that "cases interpreting
Brekka and Nosal indicate that a nontechnological barrier can revoke authori-
zation."l94 In NetApp, one defendant, a former employee of Nimble with ac-
cess to NetApp's computer system, continued to use his login credentials to
access NetApp's system after their relationship ended.195 NetApp sued the
employee under the CFAA, claiming he was accessing its protected computer
system without authorization.196 The employee did not deny that he accessed
information without permission.197 Instead, he argued his access did not vio-
late the CFAA because NetApp had not disabled his login credentials.198 Ac-
cording to the employee, the CFAA required NetApp to establish
technological barriers to the former employee's access to demonstrate a lack
of authorization.199Without an actual circumvention of such barriers, the de-
fendant argued, there could be no CFAA violation.200 NetApp countered that
the existence or circumvention of technological barriers is not necessary to
establish a CFAA violation.201 The court agreed, finding that the weight of
current authority supportedNetApp's interpretation.202
i. NetApp's Homeowner/Houseguest Analogy Applied
In reaching this decision, the NetApp court examined numerous cases
that the employee argued supported his position, but ultimately found that
they failed to justify his arguments. 203 Following its analysis, the court enter-
tained a helpful analogy:
NetApp analogizes this case to a conventional property crime, ar-
guing that "[u]nder Reynolds' theory, a thief has license to bur-
glarize a house because a window is left open." However, a closer
analogy would be a situation where a houseguest receives a key,
[then is] told he is no longer welcome but keeps the key, and the
homeowner neglects to change the lock. Reynolds's arguments
suggest that if the former houseguest continues to reenter the
193. See NetApp, Inc. v. Nimble Storage, Inc., No. 5:13-CV-05058-LHK (HRL),
2014 WL 1903639, at *10 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2014).
194. Id.
195. Id. at *1.
196. Id. at *2.
197. See id. at *8.
198. Id.
199. NetApp, Inc., 2014 WL 1903639, at *8.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at *9.
203. See id. at *10-11.
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house, the houseguest would not be acting "without authorization"
or "exceed[ing] authorized access," even though he knows he may
not return. Current CFAA doctrine does not allow this result. Ac-
cordingly, Reynolds's arguments do not warrant dismissal of any
of NetApp's CFAA claims on this basis.204
To put the case into perspective, the analogy need only be taken one
step further. Instead of the houseguest taking his key and leaving after being
told he is no longer welcome, he surreptitiously changes the locks, forces the
homeowners out, and does not allow them to reenter their own home. He
then claims no CFAA violation occurs because the homeowners did not use
barriers to keep him out-after he had already locked them out and was in
complete control!
e. Weingand v. Harland Fin. Solutions, Inc.
In NetApp, Inc., the court heavily relied on its decision in Weingand v.
Harland Financial Solutions, Inc., an instructive and factually similar case.205
In Weingand, an employer granted its former employee post-termination per-
mission to retrieve his "personal files" from the company's computer.206 In
its CFAA counter-claim, the company alleged that the former employee had
"accessed, without authorization, over 2,700 business files."207 However, the
employee argued that his access was not without authorization because the
company did not establish technical barriers to keep him from accessing the
files.208 The court disagreed, stating that,"Ninth Circuit authority (un-altered
by Nosal) indicates that if a former employee accesses information without
permission, even if his prior log-in information is still operative as a techni-
cal matter, such access would violate the CFAA."209 The court explained:
Although Plaintiffs counsel contended at oral argument that
Plaintiffs level of verbal (or non-technical) authorization was ir-
relevant because the only "authorization" to which the statute
speaks is "code" authorization (i.e., whether someone is literally
blocked from certain files by some security measure such as a
password), Plaintiff offers no authority to support such a narrow
interpretation. It is true that Nosal uses the phrase "physical ac-
cess" to describe the expansive interpretation of the CFAA the
204. Id. at *11 (internal citations omitted).
205. See NetApp, Inc., 2014 WL 1903639, at *10 (citing Weingand v. Harland Fin.
Solutions, Inc., No. C- 11-3109 EMC, 2012 WL 2327660, at *2, *7-9 (N.D.
Cal. June 19, 2012)).
206. Weingand, 2012 WL 2327660, at *2.
207. Id. at *1.
208. Id. at *3.
209. Id. (citing LVRC Holdings v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2009)).
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government proposed (and the court rejected). However, the pre-
vious sentence of the opinion makes clear that the court was con-
cerned only with the distinction between access and use, not with
any distinction between types of authorization pertaining to
access. 210
f. Will the CFAA Amendment Impact these Cases?
The CFAA Amendments were designed to focus on the misuse of ac-
cess and data by privileged users, not users whose privileges were either
terminated or never existed. Generally, courts find that non-privileged users
have accessed a computer "without authorization," but the amendments focus
on users who "exceed[ ] [their] authorized access."
Case law demonstrates that owners who are aware of misuse may termi-
nate authorization with clear notice, rendering any subsequent access a viola-
tion of the CFAA. This is true even in jurisdictions where courts are reluctant
to find authorization abuse or the misuse of information by a privileged user.
Additionally, notice provides computer owners with a remedy for prior mis-
use of computers or data by privileged users by terminating the authorization
needed for future misuse. However, notice does not provide a tool for owners
to use proactively. Thus, the issue of preventing privileged users from acces-
sing and misusing information remains unresolved.
5. Non-Privileged User Access of Computer or Data
This describes the conduct that most people think of when they hear the
word "hacking"-someone who does not have any rights to access a com-
puter is accessing it anyway. This leads back to the beginning of CFAA
jurisprudence and the very first conviction under the CFAA in United States
v. Morris.2 11 Robert Morris was a "student in Cornell University's computer
science Ph.D. program" who had "significant computer experience and ex-
pertise."212 Morris, the original "security researcher," talked with classmates
about security vulnerabilities and "began work on a computer program, later
known as the INTERNET 'worm' or 'virus,"' to test his theories.213 Eventu-
210. Id. (citing United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 857 (9th Cir. 2012)) (internal
citation omitted).
211. See United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 505 (2d Cir. 1991); Joseph P. Daly,
The Computer Fraud & Abuse Act-A New Perspective: Let the Punishment
Fit the Damage, 12 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 445, 445 (1993)
("In United States v. Morris, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit heard the first criminal prosecution of a computer virus crime under the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 .
212. Morris, 928 F.2d at 505.
213. Id. (explaining that Morris developed the program "to demonstrate the inade-
quacies of current security measures on computer networks by exploiting the
security defects that [he] had discovered.").
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ally, Morris released his complex and stealth program "from a computer at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology ... to disguise the fact that it came
from [him] at Comell."214 The worm spread much faster "than he had antici-
pated" and "crashed" computers "around the country," "including [those at]
leading universities, military sites, and medical research facilities."215 The
cost of Morris' security research project "at each installation ranged from
$200 to more than $53,000."216 The Second Circuit upheld Morris' convic-
tion for accessing the various computers "without authorization."217
Since Morris, those prosecuted under the CFAA engaged in typical
"hacking," like the "Anonymous" hackers, 2 18 the individuals who stole pri-
vate information from other people's computers, 219 and foreign state spon-
sored hackers who attacked American companies.220 The CFAA Amendment
was not intended to impact and should not impact this category of cases.
IV. IF THIS Is NOT IT, THEN WHERE Do WE FiND
THE GOLDEN MEAN?
When stripping away the awkward structural framework into which the
CFAA cases have been forced, as well the artificial labels that have been
applied to those cases, one can see where the real root of the problem lies and
where the focal point for the legislative fix-as well as the judicial fix-
resides. The courts are forcing the CFAA cases into an awkward structural
framework. When this framework is stripped away, the root of the problem
becomes apparent. This is where the focal point for a legislative and judicial
fix lies. How do we prevent privileged users from using their authorization to
(1) misuse the computers or data during authorized use, or (2) misuse data
214. Id. at 505-06.
215. Id. at 506.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 505.
218. See Jeremy Hammond Sentenced To 10 Years In Prison, HUFFINGTONPOST
.Com (Nov. 15, 2013, 2:37 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/15/
jeremy-hammond-sentenced n_4280738.html (reporting that Jeremy Ham-
mond stole "files as part of the online hacking collective Anonymous.").
219. See Shawn E. Tuma, Hunter Moore or Aaron Swartz: Do we hate the CFAA?
Do we love the CFAA? Do we even have a clue?, BUSINESS CYBER RISK LAW
(Jan. 24, 2014), http://shawnetuma.com/2014/01/24/what-do-we-want-do-we-
hate-the-cfaa-do-we-love-the-cfaa-do-we-even-have-a-clue/ (discussing four
individuals who were prosecuted under the CFAA).
220. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Charges
Five Chinese Military Hackers for Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations
and a Labor Organization for Commercial Advantage (May 19, 2014), availa-
ble at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-
cyber-espionage-against-us-corporations-and-labor ("The indictment alleges
that the defendants conspired to hack into American entities . . .").
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obtained during an authorized use, after the time of the authorized access?
This is the heart of the problem. This is the objective that was set forth by the
President during his State of the Union address, in which he made his case
for the CFAA Amendment.221 Despite the President's admirable aspiration
and efforts, unfortunately, it is unlikely that the CFAA Amendment will ac-
complish this objective.
The problem is that the CFAA is inherently designed to solve problems
dealing with wrongful access of computers and data.222 The courts have ap-
plied it, in a very thoughtful manner, to prohibit the wrongful use of com-
puters or data during times of access. The current problem is that the point on
the Access Continuum, where the problem lies, is post-access use of data.
This necessarily requires legislation for judicial application of the rules to
protecting the data and not the devices. While this could be done with the
CFAA, in theory, it also intrudes upon trade secret law in many ways. 2 23 So
perhaps, if there is a comprehensive solution, it will come through laying on
the table both the proposed CFAA and the federal trade secret law.224 Legis-
latures could meld them together into a seamless tool that is focused on solv-
ing the problems, and not trying to fit them in to an artificial category. This
requires focusing first on the problem to be solved, not focusing on the tools
to solve the problem that still lacks an accurate definition.
This leads to multiple conclusions. First, assuming the CFAA Amend-
ment was not intended to negate the civil cause of action, Congress needs to
correct the language to ensure there is no question as to its validity.225 If it
was intended to negate the civil cause of action, then that is a disastrous idea
that must be stopped. Second, while the CFAA Amendment may theoreti-
cally help resolve some of the confusion about the application of the law to
certain insider misuse situations, it would not resolve the primary problem of
insider misuse/post-use of data.2 26 Further, this causes more confusion and
litigation, which is counterproductive as it leads to less predictability in the
application of the law. Third, by rewriting the definition of "exceeding au-
thorized access," we lose the ample body of jurisprudence interpreting the
statute.227
What all of this shows is that ultimately, the CFAA Amendment is not a
well-planned, comprehensive, and refined solution. But it is still valuable.
The President offered many great concepts, and demonstrated a willingness
221. See CFAA Amendment, supra note 2.
222. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008).
223. See New Show Studios v. Needle, No. 2:14-cv-01250-CAS(MRWx), 2014 WL
2988271, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 2014).
224. See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2014, S. 2267, 113th Cong. (2014).
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to attack this issue. Additionally, the President gave legislators more material
to work with in trying to create an acceptable solution that will meet the
stated objectives, or help to realize that the law cannot do so with this statute
alone.
Have we found Aristotle's Golden Mean in terms of finding the proper
balance for applying the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to misuse by privi-
leged users? Probably not. But the search continues and we have made, and
continue to make, progress. We are narrowing the zone where it likely lies
but we have not found the solution to the problem.
Case Notes

